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Abstract - In this paper, we analyze the stateless SYN-
SYN&ACK and SYN-FIN/RST detection mechanisms for 
TCP SYN attacks. We indicate the inherent vulnerability of 
the SYN-FIN/RST detection mechanism caused by the 
computation of the RST packet counts. We indicate why SYN-
SYN&ACK is a more efficient and reliable detection 
mechanism than SYN-FIN/RST. We come up with ‘Bot 
Buddies’ for TCP SYN attacks and explain how the use of 
them can compromise both mechanisms. We propose an 
enhanced detection mechanism incorporating the Bloom filter 
to handle these variations of TCP SYN attacks. We show that 
our enhanced mechanism overcomes the problems of the use 
of Bot Buddies and analyse its efficiency. 
Keywords - Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, TCP SYN 
Flood, DDoS Detection, Network Security. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since its first appearance in 1999, Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks [1] have continued to become more 
prevalent in the Internet, with attacks targeting banking and 
financial companies, online gambling firms, web retailers 
and governments. The 2007 Symantec Threat Report [2] 
indicates that over 5000 DoS attacks were observed 
worldwide on a daily basis. In 2006, backscatter analysis 
[3] was conducted where DDoS attack traffic was captured. 
It shows that over a period of 3 years from 2001 to 2004, 
22 collected distinct traces revealed 68,700 attacks on over 
34,700 distinct Internet hosts, with 95% of the attacks 
using TCP as their choice of protocol. A recent survey [4] 
of 55 tier 1, tier 2 and hybrid IP network operators in North 
America, Europe and Asia reported that DDoS attacks 
remain the most significant ISP security threat with TCP 
SYN attacks leading the pack.  
 
Figure (1a) TCP 3-way handshake (1b) TCP SYN Attack 
In TCP, to establish a connection (before being able to 
carry out data transmission between the server and the 
client), the client sends a SYN to the server. The server 
allocates a buffer for the client and replies with a 
SYN&ACK1 packet. At this stage, the connection remains 
in the half-open state while waiting for the ACK reply from 
the client to complete the connection setup, after which the 
3-way handshake is achieved. TCP SYN DDoS attacks 
exploit the TCP 3-way handshake. The attackers spoof the 
source IP addresses of the massive amount of SYN packets 
they send to the victim servers. As a result, the SYN&ACK 
response packets do not reach the attackers’ machines and 
the final ACK packets are not sent to the victim server to 
complete the 3-way handshake. Therefore, resources at the 
victim server are tied up for these half-open state 
connections created by the attackers preventing services to 
be granted to other legitimate requests. 
Previous work on mitigating TCP SYN attacks include 
SYN cache [5], SYN cookie [6], SYNDefender [7] and 
Synkill [8]. These work aim to mitigate the flooding effect 
on the victim server. Previous work on detecting SYN 
attacks include Spectral analysis based detection [9], SYN 
arrival rate based detection [10], SYN-SYN&ACK based 
detection [11], and SYN-FIN/RST based detection [12].  
Details are in the next section. 
In this paper, we analyze the two existing stateless and 
efficient detection mechanisms, the SYN-SYN&ACK and 
SYN-FIN/RST schemes, in view of current and new 
variations of TCP SYN attacks. We find that these schemes 
are vulnerable to existing and new forms of attacks, and 
propose an enhanced SYN attack detection scheme to 
overcome these vulnerabilities.  
2. RELATED WORK 
In SYN cache [5], a hash table keeps track of the half-
open state connections instead of relying on the backlog 
queue provided for each application. Therefore, a higher 
number of half-open state connections are possible but, 
during an attack, this is still insufficient. In addition, items 
in the hash table would have to be dropped constantly to 
allow for new requests and may result in even higher 
overhead and overwhelming the victim server during an 
attack.  
                                                                 
1 SYN&ACK is used to represent that both the SYN and ACK 
flags are set. 
SYN cookie [6] eliminates the need for the backlog 
queue to keep track of each SYN request. Instead, a SYN 
cookie, also used as the initial sequence number in the 
SYN&ACK sent back to the client, is computed based on a 
counter at the server, the Maximum segment size in the 
SYN queue entry and the TCP header of the request packet. 
The ACK returned from the client must contain a sequence 
number of the SYN cookie plus one to be valid. However, 
the drawbacks of this scheme are the overhead of 
computing the cookies during an attack. Retransmission 
required in the situation of lost ACK packet is also not 
possible as the state of the connection request is not stored. 
In addition, TCP options which are not encoded in the 
SYN cookie are lost, denying the use of certain TCP 
performance enhancement. 
In SYNDefender [7], the firewall intercepts the SYN 
request from the client and sends the SYN&ACK packet on 
the behalf of the server. After the firewall receives the 
ACK packet, the request is then let through to the server. In 
this way, the server does not need to hold the half-open 
states and so does not deplete its resources. However, the 
weakness is the additional workload and processing within 
the firewall which might not cope during a high rate attack. 
In Synkill [8], source IP addresses are classified in a 
database as good or bad based on observed network traffic 
and administratively supplied input. Bad source addresses 
are sent the RST packet to terminate their requests while 
good ones are allowed to carry on with the handshaking.  
However, the above methods only deal with mitigating 
the flooding effect of the SYN attacks and most of them are 
stateful mechanisms, which could be subjected to DDoS 
attacks themselves.  
Spectral analysis based SYN attack detection [9] 
monitors the arrival rates of the traffic flows as a signal. 
The power spectral of the signal for a normal TCP flow is 
found to exhibit strong periodicity around its round-trip 
time (RTT) in both directions, whereas that of the DDoS 
attack traffic flows are not regulated in such a way. 
However, the scheme deals with long TCP flows. For TCP 
flows with short durations, the effect of their statistical 
multiplexing may outweigh their intrinsic periodicity and 
be detected as attack flows. RTTs of flows also vary from 
trip to trip which makes it difficult to obtain a reliable 
model to represent the normal traffic for different traffic 
conditions. Another limitation of the scheme is that it 
cannot identify TCP flows with very small RTTs. 
The SYN arrival rate based detection scheme [10] 
models the arrival rate of the normal SYN packets as a 
normal distribution. A very reliable model of the normal 
traffic pattern has to be maintained. It allows a high rate 
SYN attack to be detected quickly and accurately. 
However, compared to non-parametric approaches such as 
the SYN-FIN/RST detection [12], it was not able to detect 
low rate attack (e.g. < 14 SYNs/sec). Therefore, a low rate 
attack would still be able to bring down the victim server 
without being detected. 
Non-parametric approaches such as the SYN-
SYN&ACK [11] and SYN-FIN/RST [12] detection 
mechanisms allow attack detection even in the case of any 
variance of normal traffic making them insensitive to site 
and access patterns. The SYN-SYN&ACK detection 
mechanism is based on the inherent TCP SYN – 
SYN&ACK pairs’ behavior. With a SYN request sent out 
by a client to a server, it must also receive a SYN&ACK 
reply. An attack host spoofing as a client would only send 
out massive amount of SYN requests and not receive any 
SYN&ACK replies from the victim server due to its 
spoofed address. The SYN-SYN&ACK agent monitors the 
difference of the number of outgoing SYN and incoming 
SYN&ACK packets. It then uses the non-parametric 
Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) approach to detect any abrupt 
rise in the difference. The SYN-FIN/RST approach 
proposed by the same authors allows detection both at the 
attackers’ and victim’s ends. For a normal TCP connection, 
a starting SYN request will be ended by a FIN/RST to 
close the connection. Therefore, correlation is performed 
between the number of SYN and FIN/RST packets instead. 
However, as RST can be classified as active (i.e. initiated 
to abort TCP connection) and passive (i.e. transmitted in 
response to packets destined to a closed port), and could 
not be easily differentiated at the monitoring agents, the 
scheme counts 75% of all RST packets to be active and the 
rest to be passive (i.e. background noise). Non-parametric 
CUSUM is also used to detect the abrupt rise in the 
difference between the SYN and the FIN/RST packets. We 
analyze both schemes in the next section at their current 
state and in view of proposed new variations of TCP SYN 
attacks. 
3. SYN-FIN/RST AND SYN-SYN&ACK 
ANALYSIS 
In SYN-FIN/RST, SIN, FIN and RST packets in both 
directions are monitored and counted. To address the issue 
of passive RST packets, only 75% are counted as valid 
RST. These valid RST are added to the FIN packets and 
the difference between the number of SYN and FIN/RST 
packets for each monitoring interval is computed. Any 
abrupt positive fluctuation in this difference would signal 
the occurrence of an attack. 
We find that classifying 75% of RST packets as valid 
ones weaken the detection mechanism. RST packets can be 
generated by a host for the following events: 
i. arrival of data packets for which no connection has 
been established 
ii. arrival of TCP segments with inappropriate sequence 
numbers 
iii. arrival of SYN&ACK packets for which no SYN has 
been initiated 
iv. arrival of TCP packets for closed ports 
In the event of a SYN attack, attackers could target 
random ports as in [13]. In this case, the victim server 
would generate RST packets due to (iv). In addition, source 
address spoofing is used by the attackers. Therefore, the 
SYN&ACK packets generated by the victim server would 
be delivered to hosts located at the spoofed addresses. They 
would generate RST packets to the victim server due either 
to the events in (iii) and (iv) as well. Whichever the case, 
RST packets generated by the above events should not be 
classified as valid packets. 
In [13], DDoS attack tools in Bots could send a mixture 
of SYN and ACK packets to the victim. Instead, a new 
variation of attack could be easily created by sending out a 
mixture of SYN, FIN and RST packets to the victim server. 
This would result in balancing the SYN and FIN/RST 
packets, and thus weakens or even defeats the SYN-
FIN/RST detection mechanism. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the SYN-
SYN&ACK approach is applicable at the source of the 
attack instead of the victim’s end due to the detection 
which is based on the behaviour of SYN and SYN&ACK 
pairs. Having the detection mechanism closer to the attack 
sources allows a speedier detection before a damaging 
impact could be at the the victim server. As the attackers 
send out SYN packets and do not receive any SYN&ACK 
from the victim due to source IP address spoofing, this 
approach is very efficient in attack detection. In 
comparison to the SYN-FIN/RST detection scheme, the 
SYN-SYN&ACK scheme also allows a higher degree of 
correlation and accuracy detection due to the shorter round 
trip time between the SYN-SYN&ACK pairs instead of the 
time difference between the SYN-FIN/RST pairs, which 
last for the whole duration of the TCP session. Therefore, a 
shorter monitoring interval and detection time could be 
achieved in the case of the SYN-SYN&ACK detection 
approach. 
As mentioned above, it would be possible to create a 
new variation of the attack by sending out a mixture of 
SYN and SYN&ACK packets as well. However, as only 
the outgoing SYN and incoming SYN&ACK packets are 
counted, even if the attackers were to make such 
modifications to the attack code, it would not have any 
impact on the detection mechanism. Instead, the 
SYN&ACK packets would only weaken the attack (by 
reducing the SYN attack traffic sent to the victim due to 
resources used for sending out SYN&ACK packets). 
Instead, we come up with another new variation of co-
ordinated attack to defeat the SYN-SYN&ACK detection 
mechanism. We named this attack the ‘Bot Buddy’ Attack 
(shown in Figure 2), as it requires the co-operation of bots 
within the botnet carrying out the SYN attack. For each 
SYN packet sent out to the victim server, a SYN&ACK 
packet with the source address spoofed to the victim server 
is sent to another bot within the botnet. In this case, each 
outgoing SYN packet has an incoming SYN&ACK 
“reply”. This attack will therefore circumvent the SYN-
SYN&ACK detection. Although the diagram shows a 2-
buddy botnet system which is the safest case for the 
attacker, it is also feasible to have 1 bot responsible for 
sending to multiple bots (i.e. 1 to Many Bot Buddies 
Attack) as shown in Figure 3. The reason is that only the 
outgoing SYN and incoming SYN&ACK counts are 
monitored. In addition, as the Bot master has a list of all the 
bots in the botnet, this attack could be easily implemented. 
 
Figure 2: Bot Buddy Attack 
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Figure 3: 1 to Many Bot Buddies Attack 
As the SYN-FIN/RST detection mechanism has an 
inherent flaw and the SYN-SYN&ACK detection 
mechanism proved to be a more efficient and effective for 
SYN attack detection, we propose an enhancement to the 
SYN-SYN&ACK detection mechanism to resolve the 
above vulnerabilities.   
4. ENHANCED TCP SYN ATTACK DETECTION 
As in the original SYN-SYN&ACK detection 
mechanism, the packet sniffing agents are located at the 
leaf routers that connect end hosts to the Internet. We 
consider the SYN and SYN&ACK packets sent by the 
bots. We assume that the source IP addresses of the SYN 
packets are randomly spoofed (systematic spoofing will be 
considered in future work), whether all 4 bytes or just the 
host suffix of the IP address. Therefore, the following 
situation shown in Figure 4 arises. 
 
Figure 4: Attack Packet’s Header 
Since the source IP address used in the SYN packet 
does not match the destination IP address in the 
SYN&ACK packet received at Bot_1, we could perform 
SYN-SYN&ACK pair matching to eliminate the effect 
caused by the Bot Buddy Attack on the SYN-SYN&ACK 
detection mechanism. Instead of storing the flow addresses 
to perform matching, we propose using Bloom filters [14] 
to achieve space and time efficiency. We describe the 
algorithm of our mechanism as follows. 
In our detection mechanism, we define our Bloom 
filter, F[0…m-1], as an m-bit array which is initialized to 0. 
We define each element to be stored in the filter as eout, 
which corresponds to the SYN packet being sent out. 
)1(destsrceout ⊕=  
k hash functions, h1()…hk(), are used to compute k key 
values for eout and eout is stored into the filter by,  
)2(0,1]mod)([ ktoiformehF outi ==  
For the incoming SYN&ACK packet, the same 
equation (1) to compute eout is used to compute the 
corresponding element, ein. In a normal TCP 3-way 
handshake, there will be an outgoing SYN with element 
value of eout which is equal to an incoming SYN&ACK 
with element value of ein. To be counted as a valid 
SYN&ACK packet for inclusion into the CUSUM 
detection algorithm, all the bits at positions, 
}mod)({ meh ini  in the filter array must be set to 1. In the 
next section, we perform evaluations and analysis of our 
detection mechanism. 
5. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS 
Using the Bloom filter to validate the SYN&ACK 
replies allows space and time efficiency. The time required 
to store and search for an element in the filter is a fixed 
constant, O(k), which is independent of the size of the filter 
and the number of stored elements. The space allocated to 
the Bloom filter is m bits. This allocation depends on the 
availability of storage space on the leaf router. The Bloom 
filter has a zero false negative (i.e. if an element has been 
stored, it will be found in the filter) but a non-zero false 
positive (i.e. if an element has not been stored, it might still 
return the status of “found”). Assuming that the hash 
functions spread the elements evenly across the filter array, 
let p0 be the probability that a bit in the array is not set (i.e. 
0) by any of the hash functions after storing n elements. Let 
p1 be the probability that the bit is set (i.e. 1).  
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For a false positive error to occur, during a search of an 
element, each of the k array positions computed by the hash 
functions for the element must be set to 1. Therefore, the 
probability of a false positive error, pe, is given by: 
)5()( 1
k
e pp =  
We see that, as m, the array size, increases, pe will 
decrease. However, as n, the number of elements to be 
stored, increases, pe will increase too.  
Other than the false positive error from the Bloom 
filter, we may consider the possibility of error coming from 
the address spoofing algorithm. That is, if the spoofed 
source IP address of the outgoing SYN packet happens to 
be the same as the destination of the incoming SYN&ACK 
reply generated by the Bot Buddy. This address would also 
be the real address of the Bot sending out the SYN attack 
packet. Although the SYN packet would not constitute an 
attack packet in this case as a SYN&ACK reply would be 
received from the victim thus completing the 3-way 
handshake and establishing the connection, we have to take 
into consideration the additional SYN&ACK reply that 
would come from the bot buddy. Assuming that all 32 bits 
of address are spoofed, the probability of collision (with 
the real source address) is given as: 
)6(
2
1
32=cp  
However, if partial address spoofing whereby network 
prefix of the real address is preserved when performing 
spoofed address generation, and q is the number of bits of 
the preserved network prefix,  
)7(
2
1
32 qcp −=  
We now analyze our enhanced detection mechanism 
taking into consideration the false positive error of the 
Bloom filter and the collision of the spoofed address. As in 
the original SYN-SYN&ACK detection mechanism, let 
{∆t, t=0,1,…} be the number of outgoing SYN packets 
minus that of the incoming SYN&ACK packets collected 
from each sampling period.  
)8(& ttt ACKSYNSYN −=∆  
To alleviate its dependence on the time, access pattern and 
size of the network, {∆t} is normalized by the average 
number K  of incoming SYN&ACK packets during the 
sampling period. The recursive estimation of K  is given 
by: 
)9(&)1(1 ttt ACKSYNKK αα −+= −  
where t is the discrete time index and α is a constant 
between 0 and 1 to represent the memory in the estimation. 
We define ttt KX /∆=  whereby the mean of Xt, 
denoted by c, is much less than 1. In 
general, 1)( <= cXE t . A parameter ca >  is chosen 
and aXX tt −=~  is defined so that a negative mean is 
achievable during normal operation. When an attack 
occurs, tX
~
 quickly become a large positive number. The 
abrupt rise detection is based on the observation of 
ch >> , whereby the increase in the mean of tX~  can be 
lower bounded by h .  
)10(00 =y  
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yt is defined as the maximum continuous increment until 
time n. A large yt is a strong indication of an attack. 
Equation (11) indicates that yt is set to )
~( 1 tt Xy +−  if this 
value is ≥ 0 else it is set to 0. N is defined as the attack 
threshold, i.e. Nyt ≥ indicates an attack is detected. 
Taking into consideration the false positive errors in the 
Bloom filter search and the collision error of the spoofed 
address, we get 
)12(
&
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during a Bot Buddy SYN attack. SYNt,norm are the number 
of SYN packets and SYN&ACKt,norm are the number of 
SYN&ACK packets from the legitimate traffic 
respectively, in interval t. SYNt,att are the number of SYN 
packets and Errt,att are the number of SYN&ACK packets 
from the Bot Buddy attack respectively, at interval t. Note 
that in the original SYN-SYN&ACK detection mechanism, 
Errt,att will be large (i.e. ≈SYNt,att) and the attack will not be 
detectable. In our detection approach, Errt,att is given by: 
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As in the case of collision, 2pc represents one SYN&ACK 
returned from the victim server and the other from the Bot 
Buddy. Only when there is no collision is there a 
possibility of false positive error in the Bloom filter (i.e. 
there is no matching SYN element stored but searching 
returns true). This is represented by (1-pc)(pe) in the 
equation. n in equation (3), which is used to derive pe, 
refers to the number of stored elements already present in 
the bloom filter. At the beginning of the first sampling 
period, n starts with 0. Subsequently, n is incremented as 
SYN packets, both legitimate and attack, arrive. We will 
consider element removal in the future work (plan in 
Section 6). 
Using the experiment parameters in the paper 
describing the original SYN-SYN&ACK detection 
mechanism, the sampling period is set to 20 seconds. We 
choose the attack rate to be 60 SYN packets/second.  
In [11], the normal traffic traces dated September 2000, 
of the outgoing SYN and incoming SYN&ACK were 
obtained from the University of North Carolina (monitored 
on the high-speed OC-12, 622Mbps link connecting its 
Chapel Hill campus network to the rest of the world). The 
traces show that the normal outgoing SYN packets 
fluctuated from around 1200 to 1900, while the incoming 
SYN&ACK packets fluctuated from around 1050 to 1700, 
in 10-second sampling intervals. The traces show 
consistent synchronization between the SYN and 
SYN&ACK packets. Therefore, ∆t is consistently around 
200 during normal operations in 10 seconds, which is 400 
in 20 seconds, the detection mechanism’s sampling period.  
As for our mechanism, we set k=1 (i.e. one hash 
function), m=33,554,432 (i.e. Bloom filter size of 4MB) 
and assume that the bot spoofs 32 bits of the source 
address. In [15], the RTTs for FTP downloads at 6 different 
Internet sites have been found to average to 65.27ms. 
Therefore, we assume that each SYN&ACK packet would 
take 65.27ms to reach the leaf router of the attack bot. The 
outgoing SYN packets would not incur much delay as the 
leaf router is located very close to the attack source. The 
attack arrival rates are set to 60 packets/second (i.e. around 
3 packets every 50ms assuming 15.27ms incurred for the 
generation of the attack packets and minor trip time to the 
leaf router), and the normal SYN traffic arrival rate is 
averaged at 155 packets/second (i.e. (1200+1900)/(2*10)) 
or around 10 packets every 65.27ms; no delay is assumed 
here as the data is obtained from traces and is the actual 
arrival rate at the leaf router). Therefore, we assume that n 
at each arrival of a Bot Buddy SYN&ACK to be 
20x1550=31000 (i.e. legitimate SYN packets in 1 sampling 
period) plus the time slots of 65.27ms that have passed 
multiplied by 13, as we assume starting the attack one 
sampling period later than the legitimate traffic. 
The first computation of Errt,att will begin only after the 
arrival of the first SYN&ACK packet (i.e. comes after 
SYN packets and n will be > 0). Figure 5 shows the Errt,att 
for the samples. We observed that after 10 minutes of 
attack, the number of incorrectly validated SYN&ACK 
packets is just about 1. Therefore, we can be assured that 
our enhanced detection mechanism will detect SYN attacks 
effectively even in the face of the Bot Buddy attack. 
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Figure 5: Error Rates Computation 
 
6. FUTURE WORK 
Both development of the original SYN/SYN&ACK 
detection mechanism and our enhanced detection 
mechanism is near completion. We plan to run experiments 
to compare the performance of both approaches in the 
situations of the original TCP SYN attack and new 
variations of the attack. As hash functions are used to 
compute the key values for storage of the elements in the 
Bloom filter, we would like to find out the overhead 
incurred in an experimental scenario. The selection of k 
(the number of hash functions) and m (the size of the 
Bloom filter), and their effect on the detection speed and 
false positive rate will also be studied. We have not 
considered the removal of elements from the Bloom filter, 
which is an essential feature of the scheme, in this paper. 
We will include the study in our future work as well, 
considering Counting Bloom Filter. 
7. CONCLUSION 
We have analyzed the stateless SYN-SYN&ACK and 
SYN-FIN/RST detection mechanisms. We discover the 
inherent vulnerability of the SYN-FIN/RST detection 
mechanism caused by the RST packet counts. Both 
mechanisms also suffered in terms of reliability in view of 
our new variations of TCP attacks. Although, the SYN-
SYN&ACK detection mechanism is found to be more 
efficient and reliable compared to the SYN-FIN/RST, it 
fails to detect our Bot Buddy attack. We proposed an 
enhanced detection mechanism incorporating the Bloom 
filter to handle the attack. We analyzed and evaluated our 
enhanced mechanism and found it to work as effectively as 
the original SYN&ACK, as if the Bot Buddy attack is not 
present. 
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